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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated §78A-3-102 and §78A-4-103 which placed the matter before the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah, and the Order dated May 13, 2009 which transferred the
matter from the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition
pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure as of June 3, 2009.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES and STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE: Whether the Trial court appropriately granted CST's Motion for
Summary Judgment when Strickly failed to controvert any of the facts presented in
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evidence CST provided in its Motion for Summary Judgment.
Standard of Review: Pursuant to I Jtah R ule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary
judgment is appro;):);! iate w hei e a i i io\ ant cai i ,4 sho\ v 1:1 lat tl lei e is i 10 gei 11 lii le issue as tc
any 1 i laterial fact," and that the movant is entitled to "judgment as a matter of law.
also WebBank v. American
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summary judgment for correctness, and \icws the facih and ali reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Onis i>
J ohnson
Determinative 1 .aw: "Each fact set forth in the moving party's memorandum is
deemed admitted tor the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by the

on how to respond to a motion for summary iudument and while failure to strictly adhere
to the technical requirements of Rule 7(c)(3)(h) max k harmless, an opposing
memorandum must at least cleai 1) dispute facts ii I tl le n IC ti : n foi si in in i mi > ji ldgmei it
\
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annlicable record references. Salt Lake County v. Metro W. Ready Mix, Inc.,

2004 UT 23,1123 n. 4, 89 P 3c 1 155. Bale 1 assertions, conclusory statements and * ' '

citations to legal authority are insufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment.
See e.g. Kitchen v. Cal Gas Co., Inc., 821 P.2d 458 (Utah App. 1991); See also State v.
Garnblin, 2000 UT 44, T(6, 1 P.3d 1108.
STATUTES AND RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
URCP Rule 7. Pleadings allowed; motions
(c)(3) Content.
(c)(3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall
contain a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends no
genuine issue exists. Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and supported
by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. Each fact
set forth in the moving party's memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of
summary judgment unless controverted by the responding party.
(c)(3)(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall contain
a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, and
may contain a separate statement of additional facts in dispute. For each of the
moving party's facts that is controverted, the opposing party shall provide an
explanation of the grounds for any dispute, supported by citation to relevant materials,
such as affidavits or discovery materials. For any additional facts set forth in the
opposing memorandum, each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and
supported by citation to supporting materials, such as affidavits or discovery
materials.
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interlocutory in character, may be rendered on. the issue of liability alone although there
is a genuine issue as to the amount oi damages.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimoin: defense required Supporting and opposing
affidavits si lall be i i lade
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admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to
testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof
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interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as p r o \ ided in tl lis i tile, an adverse party m a y not .
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70A-9a-406. Discharge of account debtor — Notification of assignment
(1) Subject to Subsections (2) through (9), an account debtor on an account,
chattel paper, or a payment intangible may discharge its obligation by paying the
assignor until, but not after, the account debtor receives a notification, authenticated
by the assignor or the assignee, that the amount due or to become due has been
assigned and that payment is to be made to the assignee. After receipt of the
notification, the account debtor may discharge its obligation by paying the assignee
and may not discharge the obligation by paying the assignor.

DIAGRAM OF THE CASE
Lease Agreement
(Work for payment from Strickly)

McCABE

STRICKLY

Strickly Agreement
(Agreement to assignment)

McCabe Agreement
(Assignment of right to payment)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
CST Financial Services ("CST") is a factoring company that advances money to
individuals and businesses based upon their accounts receivable. Defendant Mike
McCabe ("McCabe") is an individual owner-operator of a commercial truck. Defendant
Strickly Truckin ("Strickly") is a truck and truck brokering company. In this case,
McCabe and Strickly entered into a contractual lease agreement which provided that
McCabe would lease his truck and personal services as operator to Strickly and in return
Strickly would pay McCabe. McCabe performed the work required of him under the
lease agreement and assigned his right to payment from Strickly to CST. In return, CST
advanced eighty-five percent (85%) of what Strickly owed McCabe to McCabe, and then
submitted McCabe's invoices to Strickly in place of McCabe for payment. Although
Strickly agreed with CST to pay CST directly for McCabe's invoices, Strickly has
refused to do so and has thus breached its contractual agreements with both CST and
McCabe.
CST filed for breach of contract by assignment in this matter on May 20, 2005. In
response, Strickly mailed a 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss to CST dated June 8, 2005, but
did not file the Motion with the Court until June 14, 2005. Strickly then proceeded to
obtain a default judgment against CST on its 12(b)(6) Motion by prematurely filing its
Notice to Submit on June 24, 2005, and then failing to correct its mistake despite
assurances to CST that it would do so. Consequently, the default was subsequently set
aside by the trial court at oral argument on November 14, 2005, and reflected in the
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court's Minute Entry Ruling entered July 31, 2006. Strickly then proceeded to file its
Answer, Cross Claim Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial on October 13, 2006, and
CST filed its Answer to Counterclaim on October 30, 2006. On November 19, 2008 the
Court entered an Order to Show Cause and on January 2, 2009, the Court held a hearing
to determine why the case should not be dismissed due to inactivity. The Court
determined at this hearing that the matter should not be dismissed and gave CST thirty
(30) days in which to file the necessary paperwork.
Consequently, on January 9, 2009, in an attempt to narrow the issues in the case,
CST submitted its Motion for Summary Judgment. CST's Motion for Summary
Judgment contained a "Statement of Uncontroverted Facts" that was approximately 36
pages long and supported by approximately 350 pages of documentation and invoices
which meticulously detailed each and every day McCabe worked for Strickly. On
January 16, 2009, Strickly responded to CST's Motion by submitting its Opposition to
Motion for Summary Judgment. Strickly's Opposition consisted mainly of a section
entitled "Undisputed Facts" that was approximately 2 pages long and failed to refute any
of the 36 pages of facts in CST's Motion for Summary Judgment, and further failed to
provide any evidence that controverted the 350 pages of documentation and invoices that
had been presented in CST's Motion for Summary Judgment other than bald assertions
that the accounting was incorrect. URCP Rule 7(c)(3)(A) provides that "Each fact set
forth in the moving party's memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary
judgment unless controverted by the responding party". Consequently, Strickly's failure
to controvert any of the facts outlined in CST's Motion for Summary Judgment
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effectually served as an admission of all the facts contained in CST's Motion for
Summary Judgment, and on April 15, 2009, the trial court was compelled to grant CST's
Motion for Summary Judgment. On May 5, 2009, Strickly filed its Notice of Appeal.
FACTS
McCabe and Strickly entered into a contractual lease agreement (the "Lease
Agreement") which provided that McCabe would lease his truck and personal services as
operator of his truck to Strickly and in return Strickly would pay McCabe. [Rec. Index
pgs. 50-51]. The Lease Agreement also provided that McCabe would be responsible to
repay Strickly for expenses incurred by Strickly to maintain and repair McCabe's truck
during the pendency of the Lease Agreement. Id.
CST is a factoring company that advances money to individuals and businesses
based upon their accounts receivable. In or around December, 2003, McCabe requested
that CST provide him factoring services wherein CST would advance funds to McCabe
for his accounts receivable. [Rec. Index pg. 170]. McCabe and CST entered into a
factoring agreement ("McCabe Agreement") on January 7, 2004. [Rec. Index pg. 206].
Per the McCabe Agreement, in return for the funds advanced to him by CST, McCabe
assigned his right to receive payment from Strickly to CST. Id. Soon after CST and
McCabe entered into the McCabe agreement, CST faxed a corresponding agreement to
Strickly ("Strickly Agreement") which explained that McCabe had assigned his right to
payment from Strickly to CST, and provided that Strickly should send all future
payments owed to McCabe directly to CST. [Rec. Index pg. 49]. Strickly approved the
assignment and signed the Strickly Agreement with CST through its agent Tracy
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Strickland. Id. From January, 2004 though August, 2004 McCabe performed work for
Strickly as required by the Lease Agreement, and was paid in advance by CST eightyfive percent (85%) of his invoices. [Rec. Index pgs. 170-202]. CST then forwarded
McCabe's invoices to Strickly for payment in full. [Rec. Index pgs. 170-519]. Each
invoice forwarded by CST consisted of the total amount that McCabe (and therefore
CST) was owed for the work McCabe had performed during the period covered by the
invoice after any and all deductions made for funds advanced by Strickly on behalf of
McCabe as well as for profit deductions as required by the Lease Agreement. Id.
The total amount McCabe was owed by Strickly per his invoices after all
deductions for funds advanced by and owed to Strickly pursuant to the Lease Agreement
was $51,793.15. [Rec. Index pg. 201]. Accordingly, CST billed Strickly for the
$51,793.15, but Strickly paid CST only $38,379.84. Id. Strickly claimed that McCabe
owed more money to Strickly for advanced funds and produced records to that effect
showing that McCabe still owed $7,718.01. [Rec. Index pg. 202]. Accordingly, CST
deducted $7,718.01 from the $51,793.15 it was owed which yielded $44,075.14. Id.
Consequently, since Strickly has only paid CST $38,379.84 and has been either unable or
unwilling to produce any documentation or evidence to the contrary, Strickly still owes
CST $5,695.30. [Rec. Index pgs. 202-03]. In pursuing legal action to recover this
$5,695.31 from Strickly, CST has accrued legal fees of not less than $13,997.25 [Rec.
Index pg. 555], and an expected additional $10,000.00 by being compelled to respond to
this appeal which is without any merit and therefore frivolous.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Utah law favors the assignability of contract rights, unless the assignment would
add to or materially alter the obligor's duty of risk. Lone Mountain Production Co, v.
Natural Gas Pipeline Co, of America, 984 F.2d 1551, 1555 (10th Cir.1992) (citing Clark
v. Shelton, 584 P.2d 875, 877 (Utah 1978)). And when an obligor receives proper notice
of assignment, he must honor it. Cooper v. Holder, 21 Utah 2d 40, 440 P.2d 15, 16 (Utah
1968). In this case McCabe's contractual right to receive payment from Strickly was
freely assignable as it did not add to or materially alter Strickly's duty of risk, and there
was nothing that legally prevented McCabe from doing so. McCabe assigned his right to
payment from Strickly to CST. [Rec. Index pg. 170]. CST was an assignee for
consideration as it advanced McCabe eighty-five percent (85%) of the amount owed on
the invoices before forwarding the invoices to Strickly for payment in full. [Rec. Index
pg. 202]. Strickly agreed with CST to make payment for the amounts it owed McCabe
directly to CST, but has failed to pay CST in full and therefore has breached its
contractual obligations to both CST and McCabe. [Rec. Index pg. 202].
In its Appellate Brief, page 30, Strickly admitted that if this were an action for
failure or refusal to honor McCabe's assignment of right to payment from CST that the
Trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of CST was proper:
"Had this truly been an action by CST against Strickly for its failure
or refusal to honor the assignment of the right to collect the accounts
receivable due to McCabe from Strickly to CST, then the Court would have
been spot on in its denial of Strickly's 12(b)(6) Motion and CST would
have been completely correct in its denials of the need for it to provide
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additional consideration to Strickly before Strickly had any obligation to
CST."
CST's Motion for Summary Judgment was precisely about the issue of Strickly's failure
to honor the assignment of the right to collect the accounts receivable due CST from
Strickly. CST stated the following in its Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment:
"McCabe and CST entered into a factoring agreement on January 7,
2004, under which McCabe assigned his accounts receivable and the right
to receive payment from his debtors to CST in exchange for CST advancing
the unreceived funds from his accounts receivable. Shortly after CST and
McCabe entered into the factoring agreement, Strickly Truckin...signed an
agreement with CST which provided that Strickly would send all payments
owed to McCabe directly to CST...Strickly has not paid CST for the
amount owed...Because of the non-payment by Strickly...CST is entitled
to judgment against Strickly." [Rec. Index pgs. 125-26].
Whether or not there was any consideration between CST and Strickly is an
irrelevant and misplaced argument as the requisite consideration existed between
McCabe and Strickly, and McCabe made a valid assignment of his right to receive
payment from Strickly to CST for consideration. [Rec. Index pg. 170]. The law of
assignment does not require that there be any consideration between the assignee and the
debtor so long as there is sufficient consideration to support the contract between the
assignor and the debtor. See generally Lone Mountain Production, 984 F.2d 1551; Clark,
584 P.2d 875.
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Neither CST nor Strickly disputes the fact that there was consideration between
McCabe and Strickly. Neither CST nor Strickly disputes that McCabe validly assigned
his right to payment from Strickly to CST and that Strickly agreed to make payment
directly to CST. Furthermore, CST has never disputed that its right to receive payment
from Strickly is contingent upon the Lease Agreement between McCabe and Strickly.
The crux of the matter is that while CST provided approximately 350 pages of invoices
and documentation to the trial court to support its claim that Strickly still owed CST at
least $5,695.30, Strickly failed to present any evidence whatsoever to the trial court to
support its claims that McCabe still owes it money, that the evidence provided by CST is
erroneous, or that Strickly has overpaid CST. [Rec. Index pgs. 590-91]. Strickly instead
chose to make only meaningless bald assertions. Id. Therefore, because Strickly failed to
abide by URCP Rule 7 and controvert any of the evidence provided in CST's Motion for
Summary Judgment and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting CST's
Motion, summary judgment in favor of CST was correct and proper and should be
affirmed by this Court. See Orvis, 2008 UT 2,16, 177 P.3d 600; Bluffdale City v. Smith,
2007 UT App 25, If 11, 156 P.3d 175; Johnson v. Dept. of Transportation, 2004 UT App
284, ]| 7 n. 2,98P.3d773.
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ARGUMENT
I.

The Order of Summary Judgment Issued by the Trial Court Should be
Affirmed Because Strickly Failed to Controvert any of the Facts Presented
in CST's Motion for Summary Judgment.
URCP Rule 7(c)(3)(A) states that: "Each fact set forth in the moving party's

memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless
controverted by the responding party." Rule 7(c)(3)(B) further provides:
A memorandum in opposition to a motion for summary judgment
shall contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's
facts that is controverted, and may contain a separate statement of
additional facts in dispute. For each of the moving party's facts that
is controverted, the opposing party shall provide an explanation of
the grounds for any dispute, supported by citation to relevant
materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. For any
additional facts set forth in the opposing memorandum, each fact
shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to
supporting materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials.
(2008). The Utah Supreme Court has recently held that while failure to strictly adhere to
the technical requirements prescribed by Rule 7(c)(3)(B) may be harmless, a
memorandum in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must at least clearly
dispute facts in the motion for summary judgment with citation to applicable record
references. Salt Lake County v. Metro W. Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 UT 23, ^|23 n. 4, 89 P.3d
155.
CST filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on January 9, 2009 which contained
a Statement of Uncontroverted Facts that was approximately thirty-six (36) pages long
and was supported by approximately 350 pages of documentation and invoices which
meticulously detailed each and every pay period of McCabe's employment with Strickly.
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[Rec. Index pgs. 125-556]. The undisputed facts asserted by CST entitled CST to prevail
on its Motion for Summary Judgment unless Strickly was able to produce evidence to the
contrary. [Rec. Index pgs. 590-91]. On January 16, 2009, Strickly submitted its
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment which consisted mainly of a section
entitled "Undisputed Facts" that was approximately 2 pages long and that failed to
controvert any of the facts meticulously outlined in CST's Motion for Summary
Judgment, but instead made only bald assertions and denials without reference to any
supporting materials. [Rec. Index pgs. 557-62; 591]. Pursuant to URCP Rule 7(c)(3)(A),
Strickly's failure to controvert any of the undisputed facts outlined in CST's Motion for
Summary Judgment thus constituted an admission of all the facts contained in CST's
Motion for Summary Judgment and the trial court was compelled to rule in favor of CST.
[Rec. Index pg. 591].
In its April 15, 2009 Minute Entry the trial court stated that "[Strickly] failed to
dispute the facts set forth in [CST's] thirty-eight pages of facts and forty-one exhibits..."
and that "[Strickly] solely presents] [its] undisputed facts, without citation to supporting
materials." Id, The trial court further cited the Utah Supreme Court in Anderson v.
Taylor, 2006 UT 79, TJ25, 149 P.3d 352 wherein the Court explained:
Our rules require "not just bald citation to authority but
development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that
authority." State v. Thomas, 961 p.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998). As we
have noted many times before, "[the] court is not a depository in
which [a] party may dump the burden of argument and research."
State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, ^[6, 1 P.3d 1108 (quotations and
citations omitted).
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Therefore, because Strickly failed to show that even a single genuine issue of
material fact existed, the trial court was compelled to rule in favor of CST, Id., and
properly granted CST's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Strickly not only failed to comply with the technical requirements of URCP 7, but
also failed to comply with the substance of the rule as outlined by the Utah Supreme
Court in Salt Lake County v. Metro W. Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 UT 23, f23 n. 4, 89 P.3d
155. Strickly's Memorandum in Opposition did not contain a verbatim restatement of
each of the facts that it disputed in CST's Motion for Summary Judgment with citation to
relevant materials, not did the body of Strickly's Memorandum in Opposition clearly
dispute facts in CST's Motion for Summary Judgment with citation to applicable record
references. [Rec. Index pgs. 557-562; 590-91]. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in entering summary judgment in favor of CST, and this Court should affirm
the trial court's ruling due to the fact that Strickly failed to comply with the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure and provide any evidence to the trial court that controverted the facts
conclusively established in CST's Motion for Summary Judgment.
II.

The Order of Summary Judgment Issued by the Trial Court Should be
Affirmed Because Strickly Failed to Marshal the Evidence in Support of
the Trial Court's Ruling.
In order to successfully challenge the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to

the trial court's ruling of summary judgment, Strickly is required to marshal the evidence
in support of the Court's ruling. See Martinez v. Media-Paymaster, 2007 UT 42, \ 17,
164 P.3d 384. In other words, Strickly is required to present all of the evidence the trial
court relied on and then demonstrate how the Court's conclusion is against the weight of
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that evidence. When an appellant fails to meet the "heavy burden" of marshalling the
evidence, the Appellate Court will generally presume "that the record supports the
findings of the trial court." Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 12, \ 24, 973 P.2d 431
(internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case the trial court specifically found in its Minute Entry granting CST's
Motion for Summary Judgment that "[Strickly's] Memorandum in Opposition fails to
comply with Rule 7(c)(3)(B)" and that "[Strickly] failed to dispute the facts set forth in
[CST's] thirty-eight pages of facts and forty-one exhibits, including an agreement signed
by Tracy Strickland acknowledging that all future payments will be payable and sent to
CST Financial Services, LLC." [Rec. Index pgs. 589-91].
Strickly's Appellate Brief fails to identify any evidence or documentation that was
before the trial court that shows Strickly's Memorandum in Opposition did in fact
comply with Rule 7(c)(3)(B), or that its Memorandum in Opposition disputed any of the
facts meticulously compiled and outlined in CST's Motion for Summary judgment.
Strickly is instead now attempting to present issues and evidence for the first time on
appeal that were never before the trial court. Consequently, Strickly has failed to marshal
the evidence in support of the trial court's ruling, and therefore the trial court's ruling of
Summary Judgment in favor of CST should be affirmed.
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III.

The Order of Summary Judgment Issued by the Trial Court Should be
Affirmed Because Strickly did not Present any Evidence to Controvert the
Facts Presented in CST's Motion for Summary Judgment and Strickly is
now Attempting to Submit Evidence in This Appeal That was Never
Before the Trial Court.

As previously articulated, URCP Rules 7(c)(3)(A) and (B) provide that a party
responding to a motion for summary judgment must controvert the facts alleged in the
motion for summary judgment, and if the responding party fails to do so the facts alleged
in the motion will be deemed admitted. Furthermore, Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure
24(a)(5)(A)-(B) provides that in order to raise an issue on appeal, an appellant must point
to either a citation in the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court, or
provide an adequate statement of the grounds for seeking review of an issue not
preserved in the trial court. "In order to preserve an issue for appeal, it must be raised in
a timely fashion, must be specifically raised such that the issue is sufficiently raised to a
level of consciousness before the trial court, and must be supported by evidence or
relevant legal authority." State v. Richins, 2004 UT App 36, \ 8, 86 P.3d 759 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
As also previously articulated, Strickly failed to comply with URCP Rules
7(c)(3)(A) and (B) and controvert any of the facts contained in CST's Motion for
Summary Judgment. [Rec. Index pgs. 590-91]. Strickly was either unable to provide the
necessary documentation or unwilling to take the time to collect even a scintilla of
evidence to controvert the facts meticulously compiled and outlined in CST's Motion for
Summary Judgment, and consequently the trial court was compelled to grant CST's
Motion for Summary Judgment. Id. This present appeal by Strickly is nothing less than
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a last-ditch effort to overcome its own failure to follow the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
as well as an attempt to circumvent and avoid the inevitable consequences of its actions.
Rather than take the time necessary to competently and cooperatively review and respond
to CST's Motion for Summary Judgment, Strickly instead submitted a cursory
Memorandum in Opposition that contained a statement of "undisputed facts" that was
approximately two pages in length and made only bald assertions without citation to any
supporting materials, and which failed to controvert any of the meticulously outlined
facts in CST's Motion for Summary Judgment. [Rec. Index pgs. 557-62; 591].
If Strickly had merely needed more time to collect the requisite evidence, there
were other avenues it could have taken such as a motion for a continuance under URCP
Rule 56(f). However, Strickly instead chose not to refute any of the undisputed facts in
CST's Motion or to produce any documentation or evidence to show that CST had
erroneously calculated the amount it claimed it was owed by Strickly under the McCabe
and Strickly Agreements. Id, Due to Strickly's failure to provide the court with any
evidence that contradicted the evidence provided by CST, the trial court was compelled
to enter summary judgment in favor of CST. [Rec. Index pg. 591]. Strickly responded
by filing this appeal. Such action should not be rewarded by this Court.
CST submitted its Motion for Summary Judgment in an attempt to narrow the
issues in this case. CST anticipated that by filing its Motion for Summary Judgment,
Strickly would produce any evidence it had in its possession to contradict the facts
contained in CST's Motion and thus the true issues of the case would become evident.
Strickly had only to point to a flaw in the calculations contained in CST's Motion for
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Summary Judgment and support its assertions with contrary documentation or evidence
in order to create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat CST's Motion for
Summary Judgment. However, Strickly failed to do so. [Rec. Index pg. 591]. Strickly's
failure to produce any documentation or evidence that contradicted the facts presented in
CST's Motion for Summary Judgment are evidence in and of itself that Strickly could not
controvert CST's assertions, and that the amount CST claimed it was owed by Strickly
was accurate.
In its Brief of Appellant, AD pg. 6, Strickly has now produced a document which
bears no sign of authenticity and which is the only document that Strickly has produced
to date that could perhaps controvert the facts and evidence presented in CST's Motion
for Summary Judgment. This document was never produced during proceedings in the
trial court, nor at any time during discovery, and was not submitted with Strickly's
Motion in Opposition to CST's Motion for Summary Judgment. Furthermore, this
document contains unverified amounts for apparent trucking expenses that are
unsubstantiated and could very well have been spontaneously concocted. However,
regardless of the nature and authenticity of this document, since it was not produced for
the trial court's review in considering CST's Motion for Summary Judgment, it is
irrelevant now in this appeal.
In its Brief, Strickly also raises issues of time and delay that are based on the Utah
state constitution but fails to provide any record cites to indicate (1) that Strickly brought
these issues to the trial court's attention, (2) that Strickly was concerned about the
amount of time the litigation process was taking in the trial court, (3) that Strickly took
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any action to accelerate the litigation, (4) that Strickly requested CST accelerate the
litigation, or (5) that Strickly was in some way damaged or prejudiced by the delay. [See
Brief of Appellant, pgs. 27-29] Strickly had the same opportunities as CST to accelerate
the litigation in this case, and in the event Strickly believed it was being prejudiced by the
amount of time being consumed by the litigation process, Strickly could have taken
action. However, Strickly chose not to do so. Strickly was evidently content to allow the
time to pass. Strickly had apparently made a strategic decision to allow the time to pass
with the hope that this case would disappear or die due to inaction or decision on the part
of CST not to pursue the case further.
Thus even in the unlikely event Strickly has presented adequate independent
grounds that afford it the ability to raise the issues of time and delay for the first time on
appeal, Strickly's failure to bring these issues to the attention of the trial court and/or to
independently take action to correct the delay and accelerate the litigation process at the
trial level if it was suffering harm due to delay, are fatal to its attempt to now raise these
issues on appeal. See generally Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A)-(B); State v. Richins, 2004
UT App 36, If 8, 86 P.3d 759.
IV.

This Court should award CST its attorney fees pursuant to Rule 33 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure as this appeal filed by Strickly is
frivolous.
Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that "if the court

determines that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or for
delay, it shall award just damages, which may include .. .reasonable attorney fees. Utah
R. App. P. 33(a). An appeal is frivolous if it "is not grounded in fact, not warranted by
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existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing
law." Id. R. 33(b). Furthermore, the Appellate Court may impose attorney fees as a
sanction if it concludes that the appeal at issue is entirely frivolous. See, e.g. Porco v.
Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 368-69 (Utah Ct.App. 1988).
In a recent unpublished opinion ruling on an appeal that presented facts similar to
the instant case, this Court awarded attorney fees pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure. See Bennion v. Bennion, 2008 WL 4183012 (Utah App.). In that
case this Court first observed that (1) the case as presented to the trial court involved
routine issues extensively governed by statutory and case law, (2) the trial court had
considerable discretion to resolve the issues presented, and (3) after the trial court had
entered its rulings [appellant] opted to bring the appeal thus incurring additional expenses
for both parties. Id. at *3. This Court then found that the appeal was frivolous and
stated:
"All of the arguments [appellant] advances on appeal are either
unpreserved because [appellant] did not raise them before the trial court,
inadequately briefed, or [are] based on facts entirely not in evidence.
Further, [appellant] failed to properly marshal the evidence in support of
his claims on appeal." Id.
In the instant case, CST's Motion for Summary Judgment as presented to the trial
court (1) involved the routine issue of summary judgment which is extensively governed
by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, statutory law and case law, (2) the trial court had
considerable discretion to resolve the issues presented by CST's Motion, and (3) after the
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trial court entered its ruling Strickly opted to bring the appeal which has incurred
additional and unnecessary expenses for both parties.
Strickly's Brief first raises the issue of "constitutional right to have remedy
without unnecessary delay". [Brief of Appellant, pg. 27]. Not only was this argument not
preserved in the trial court, it is also without merit due to the fact that (1) the trial court
timely ruled every time Strickly filed a Notice to Submit, (2) Strickly failed to take any
action itself to accelerate the litigation, (3) Strickly never requested that CST accelerate
the litigation, (4) Strickly has failed to demonstrate that it suffered any prejudice due the
alleged delay, (5) Strickly has not presented any evidence to this court to substantiate its
position and relies purely upon the bald assertion that "[Strickly was].. .severely
prejudiced by the delay", [Brief of Appellant, pg. 28], and (6) Strickly has failed to
provide the court with any law or fact that demonstrates that the trial court was required
to do anything other than what it did.
The second issue Strickly presents is "whether the trial court was correct in
denying Strickly's 12(b)(6) motion without making any factual findings that supported
the ruling." [Brief of Appellant, pg. 29]. In order for Strickly to prevail on its 12(b)(6)
motion, Strickly was required to show that CST had "fail[ed] to state a claim upon which
relief [could] be granted." Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In making its ruling
on Strickly's 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, the trial court stated in its Minute Entry pg. 4
that "a motion to dismiss concerns the sufficiency of the pleadings, not the underlying
merits of a particular case." (quoting Tuttle v. Olds, 2007 UT App 10, \ 14, 155 P.3d 893
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(citation omitted) (Emphasis added)). The trial court then quoted the United States
District Court for the District of Utah and stated:
"In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), all wellpleaded

factual

allegations,

as

distinguished from

conclusory

allegations, are accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable
to...the nonmoving party, [internal footnote omitted]. Plaintiff must
provide "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face." [internal footnote omitted]...But the court "need not accept
conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments." [internal
footnote omitted]. "The court's function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is
not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but
to assess whether the plaintiffs complaint alone is legally sufficient to
state a claim for which relief may be granted." [internal footnote
omitted].
TecServe v. Stonewar} Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58929 (D. Utah Aug. 4, 2008)
(Emphasis added)." Id. The trial court then specifically found that CST had sufficiently
demonstrated its claim of breach of contract and therefore denied Strickly's 12(b)(6)
Motion to Dismiss. [Rec. Index pgs. 592-94].
Due to the facts conclusively established by CST in its Memorandum in Support
of its Motion for Summary Judgment and Strickly's failure to provide the court with any
controverting facts, the trial court not only denied Strickly's 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss
but was compelled to grant summary judgment in favor of CST. [Rec. Index pgs. 591,
594]. In this appeal, Strickly has failed to marshal the evidence and demonstrate that the
trial court was in error in relying upon the evidence provided by CST in entering its
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ruling of summary judgment, and Strickly has further failed to point-out to this Court any
evidence that it presented to the trial court which adequately controverted the
documentary evidence provided to the trial court by CST that would demonstrate that the
trial court abused its discretion by entering summary judgment in favor of CST.
The third and final issue raised by Strickly is "whether the trial court was
correct in granting CST a Summary Judgment.. .when it interpreted the [McCabe
Agreement] to be a contract binding upon Strickly.. .without making any findings
that...a separate agreement had been formed" between Strickly and CST. [Brief of
Appellant pgs. 37-38]. This argument is misguided and misinterprets the law of
contract. As has already been discussed, in general, contractual rights and obligations
are freely assignable, and pursuant to U.C.A. § 70A-9a-406, once an account debtor
receives notification that a debt has been assigned, the only way to discharge the debt
is by paying the assignee. No separate agreement or consideration is necessary
between the account debtor and the assignee. See generally Lone Mountain
Production, 984 F.2d 1551; Clark, 584 P.2d 875. Once an assignor (McCabe) has
performed as required on the underlying contract and assigned his right to payment
from the account debtor (Strickly) to an assignee (CST), the assignee effectually
"steps into the shoes" of the assignor and the account debtor may only discharge the
debt by making payment to the assignee. See U.C.A. § 70A-9a-406. Furthermore, in
this case Strickly as the account debtor expressly agreed to the assignment. [Rec.
Index pg. 49]. Therefore, the argument advanced by Strickly that a second agreement
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between CST and Strickly was necessary in order for Strickly to be obligated to pay
CST is frivolous and without merit.
In summation, all of the arguments Strickly advances in its appeal are either
(1) without merit, or (2) unpreserved because Strickly (i) did not raise the arguments
before the trial court, (ii) inadequately briefed, or (iii) the arguments are based on
facts entirely not in evidence. Further, Strickly has failed to properly marshal the
evidence in support of its claims on appeal.
It should also be noted that in addition to the foregoing, Strickly has accused
CST of lying to the trial court when CST noted that U.C.A. § 70A-9a-406 provides
that "once an account debtor (Strickly in this case) receives proper notification that
the account has been assigned, the only way to pay off that obligation is to pay the
assignee (CST Financial). No consideration is needed to make a valid assignment"
[Brief of Appellant, pg. 35]. With regard to this accusation, rules three and four of
The Utah Standards of Professionalism and Civility state in pertinent part:
"Lawyers shall not, without adequate factual basis, attribute to other
counsel or the court improper motives, purpose or conduct...neither
written submissions nor oral presentations should disparage the
integrity, intelligence, morals, ethics, or personal behavior of an
adversary...Lawyers shall never knowingly attribute to other counsel a
position or claim that counsel has not taken or seek to create such an
unjustified inference..."
(2003). CST in no way "lie[d] to the trial court" as claimed by Strickly, and Strickly's
accusation that CST had done so was improper. CST reaffirms its position that U.C.A. §
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70A-9a-406 states that once an account debtor (Strickly in this case) receives proper
notification that the account has been assigned, the only way to pay off that obligation is
to pay the assignee (CST Financial). Furthermore, the statute does not require
consideration for the assignment prior to an account debtor being required to pay the
assignee in order to discharge the debt, and Utah case law indicates that no consideration
is needed in order to make a valid assignment. See generally Lone Mountain Production,
984 F.2d 1551; Clark, 584 P.2d 875.
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons CST respectfully requests that this Court
award CST its costs and attorney fees pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure which it has incurred by being forced to respond to Strickly's frivolous appeal.
REBUTTAL OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS
Defendant/Appellant raises the following arguments on appeal which although
already discussed at length in this Brief, Plaintiff/Appellee will restate and then dispute in
greater detail:
Issue One:

Did the trial court deny [Strickly's] constitutional right to have

remedy without unnecessary delay by (1) failing to rule upon Strickly's Rule 12(b)(6)
Motion to Dismiss for more than 1,270 days after it was filed with the Court; (2) by
allowing the plaintiff CST more than 90 days after the court entered the default judgment
against CST for CST to file its Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside Default
Certificate, although it never filed any Motion to Set Aside Default Certificate; (3) by
allowing the plaintiff CST more than 100 days after the November, 2006 hearing to serve
Strickly with the proposed findings and order to set aside the default judgment although
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the plaintiff never filed the proposed findings and order with the court; (4) by allowing
plaintiff CST 830 days, after the court set aside the default judgment against CST, to file
its Memorandum of Points and Authorities Concerning Strickly's 12(b)(6) Motion to
Dismiss with the Court.
Response:

The first argument is without merit. Strickly did file a 12(b)(6)

Motion to Dismiss, and the trial court timely ruled on the Motion each time Strickly filed
a Notice to Submit. Strickly filed its first Notice to Submit on June 24, 2005, and the
trial court entered its ruling on the Motion in favor of Strickly on June 27, 2005. [See AD
1, Trial Court Docket]. The 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss was subsequently set aside by
the trial court at oral argument November 14, 2005, due to the fact that Strickly had
improperly filed its Notice to Submit prematurely, Id., and is reflected by the trial court's
Minute Entry Ruling on July 31, 2006. Strickly thereafter filed its Answer, Cross Claim
Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial on October 13, 2006 and did not file another
Notice to Submit on its 12(b)(6) Motion until approximately four years later on January
20, 2009, at which time Strickly filed its Notice to Submit for Decision Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim or in the Alternative for Change of Venue.
Id. Although Strickly had permitted the litigation to continue for approximately four
years without objection, Strickly then proceeded to insult the trial court by filing the same
Notice to Submit two more times within the next seventy days. Id.
There is no rule that establishes a fixed time period in which the court must rule
when a party files a Notice to Submit. CST's Motion for Summary Judgment and
accompanying memoranda and evidentiary documentation comprised more than 400
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pages, therefore it was not unreasonable for the trial court to take 86 days to rule on
Strickly's 12(b)(6) Motion. In its Minute Entry entered April 15, 2009, the trial court
timely ruled on Strickly's Notice to Submit for Decision Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
for Failure to State a Claim or in the Alternative for Change of Venue, and denied
Strickly's Motion. [Record Index pg. 589-595].
Strickly's second argument in this paragraph should fail for several reasons. First,
Strickly failed to object to the timeliness of CST's Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Set Aside Default Certificate in the trial court although a hearing was held on the matter
ten days after its submission, and therefore Strickly has not preserved this issue for
appeal. Second, the entry of default judgment against CST was premature and an error
committed by the trial court based upon Strickly's improper Notice to Submit, therefore
the trial court had as long as was reasonably necessary to correct its error. See URCP
Rule 60. Furthermore, counsel for CST conducted a telephone conference with counsel
for Strickly concerning the premature submission of Strickly's 12(b)(6) Notice to Submit
wherein counsel for Strickly assured counsel for CST that he would correct his error but
then failed to do so.
Third, Strickly has unclean hands. Strickly desires this Court to overlook its
failure to comply with the explicit requirements of URCP Rule 7 in opposing CST's
Motion for Summary Judgment while at the same time demanding that this Court strictly
apply Utah Rules of Civil Procedure with regard to time in its favor. Such a selective
application of the rules would be both inequitable and unjust, and would therefore not be
in conformity with URCP Rules 1 and 8.
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Furthermore, Strickly has failed to present this Court with any evidence that it was
in any way damaged or prejudiced by CST's actions other than through the bald assertion
that "[Strickly] depending upon receiving [a] ruling before proceeding with very
expensive litigation on the merits [was] severely prejudiced by the delay." [Brief of
Appellant, pg. 28]. This unsubstantiated assertion falls woefully short of demonstrating
actual prejudice. And while it may be true that CST failed to formally file a document
entitled "Motion to Set Aside Default Certificate", pleadings are to be "liberally
construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action",
[URCP Rule 1], and "[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice",
[URCP Rule 8]. Moreover, CST's Motion to Set Aside Default Certificate was mailed to
counsel for Strickly who received and reviewed it without objection. Lastly, the
Memorandum in Support of Motion to set Aside Default Certificate that was filed by
CST articulated the requested relief and moved the court to take the requested action.
[Rec. Index pg. 62].
Strickly's third argument in this paragraph should fail for the same reasons as
Strickly's second argument. First, Strickly desires this Court to overlook its failure to
comply with the requirements of URCP Rule 7 in opposing CST's Motion for Summary
Judgment while at the same time demanding that this Court strictly apply the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure with regard to time in its favor. As has already been noted above,
such selective application of the rules would be both inequitable and unjust and not in
conformity with URCP Rules 1 and 8.
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Second, Strickly has utterly failed to present any evidence that it was in any way
damaged or prejudiced by CST's actions other than by making the bald assertion that
"[Strickly] depending upon receiving [a] ruling before proceeding with very expensive
litigation on the merits [was] severely prejudiced by the delay." [Brief of Appellant, pg.
28]. No litigation was undertaken in this matter by Strickly other than to compile short
and inadequate discovery responses and draft its six page Memorandum in Opposition to
CST's Motion for Summary Judgment, therefore the bald and unsubstantiated assertion
that it was "severely prejudiced by the delay" falls woefully short of demonstrating actual
prejudice.
Finally, Strickly's fourth argument contained in this paragraph is without merit
because Strickly failed to take any action to accelerate the litigation process in the event
it felt that it was being prejudiced by the passage of time. There was an abundance of
remedies available to Strickly to move the case along had it felt that it was being
damaged or prejudiced by the passage of time. However, Strickly failed to make use of
these remedies or to raise the issue with the trial court. Evidently Strickly had made a
strategic decision to retard the litigation, and was content to allow the time to pass.
Moreover, Strickly never objected to the amount of time it took CST to serve Strickly
with the Proposed Findings and Order, and consequently Strickly failed to preserve this
issue in the trial court.
Issue Two:

Did the court make the correct decision by denying Strickly's

12(b)(6) motion without making any findings that supported the ruling that CST had
sufficiently stated its claims of Breach of Contract and Fraud, and where Strickly claimed
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there was no valid allegation of the formation of a contract supported by consideration
between CST and Strickly made in CST's complaint. Without a contract between CST
and Strickly, there could be no fraud by Strickly.
Response:

CST's Motion for Summary Judgment was based solely on the issue

of breach of contract by assignment, [Rec. Index pgs. 163-68], therefore fraud is a nonissue. The trial court specifically stated in its Minute Entry granting CST's Motion for
Summary Judgment that "Summary judgment can only be granted if the record shows
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law", and that "doubts, uncertainties or inferences concerning
issues of fact must be construed in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary
judgment." [Rec. Index pgs. 589-90].
The trial court then proceeded to specifically find that Strickly's Memorandum in
Opposition failed to comply with URCP Rule 7. The trial court stated:
"[Strickly] failed to dispute the facts set forth in [CST's] thirtyeight pages of facts and forty-one exhibits, including an agreement
signed by Tracy Strickland 'acknowledging] that all future payments
will be payable and sent to CST Financial Services, L L C

[Strickly]

solely presents] [its] undisputed facts without citation to supporting
materials." Id. (internal citations omitted).
The only issue for decision in CST's Motion for Summary Judgment was breach
of contract by assignment, and the trial court specifically found that not only had CST
sufficiently proven its claim to survive Strickly's 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, but also
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that due to the failure of Strickly to provide any controverting evidence, CST was entitled
to summary judgment as a matter of law. [Rec. Index pg. 591].
The issue of consideration between CST and Strickly is misplaced by Strickly and
is completely irrelevant in this case. It is undisputed that McCabe and Strickly entered
into a valid contract supported by consideration and that McCabe then made a valid
assignment of his right to receive payment on the contract to CST. [Brief of Appellant,
pgs. 30-31]. When a valid assignment is made, the assignee effectually "steps into the
shoes" of the assignor and therefore possesses all of the contractual rights of the assignee.
See generally U.C.A. § 70A-9a-406; Lone Mountain Production, 984 F.2d 1551; Clark,
584 P.2d 875. It is undisputed that if Strickly had failed to pay McCabe directly for work
he performed pursuant to the contract, Strickly would have been liable for breach of
contract. Likewise, since McCabe fully performed under the contract and CST has
"stepped into the shoes" of McCabe, since Strickly has failed to pay the full amount owed
to McCabe to CST, Strickly is liable to CST for breach of contract.
According to U.C.A. § 70A-9a-406, once an account debtor receives notice of a
valid assignment, he may only discharge his debt by making payment to the assignee. In
this case, CST gave notice to Strickly that McCabe had assigned CST the right to receive
payment under his contract with Strickly, and Strickly agreed with CST to make
payments directly to CST. [Rec. Index pg. 49]. Strickly has failed to make payments as
agreed and therefore has breached its contracts with both CST and McCabe.
Strickly's arguments may be completely summed-up as follows: Strickly claims
that McCabe still owes Strickly money under the Lease Agreement, and therefore
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Strickly does not owe McCabe nor his assignee CST any money; that the McCabe and
Strickly Agreements are subject to the Lease Agreement and that Strickly has overpaid
CST for McCabe's invoices because McCabe still owes money to Strickly for expenses
Strickly advanced on his behalf. [Brief of Appellant, pgs. 26-27].
This is a plausible argument, and CST has never disputed that the amount it is
owed by Strickly is subject to the Lease Agreement between McCabe and Strickly.
However, the crux of the matter is that while CST provided both the trial court and
Strickly with a multiplicity of exhibits and documentation that conclusively proved the
amount CST is owed by Strickly, Strickly did nothing more than generally deny that it
owed any amount to CST and make bald assertions that CST instead owed it money.
[Rec. Index pgs. 557-62]. Never once did Strickly specifically deny any of the
documentary evidence provided by CST. [Id.; See also Rec. Index pgs. 569-78].
Therefore, based on all the evidence it had before it, the trial court was compelled to enter
Summary Judgment in favor of CST. [Rec. Index pg. 591]. This appeal is now Strickly's
attempt to do what it could have done in the trial court, and by so doing Strickly has
caused CST to incur litigation expenses which could easily have been avoided.
Furthermore, this appeal by Strickly is an attempt to circumvent the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and avoid the inevitable consequences of its failure to abide by them. Such
conduct should not be rewarded by this Court, and the trial court's entry of Summary
Judgment in favor of CST should be upheld.
Issue Three: Did the court correctly conclude that CST was entitled to a Summary
Judgment against Strickly when it interpreted the CST/McCabe Factoring Agreement to
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be a contract binding upon Strickly that required Strickly to pay CST amounts in excess
of what it owed to McCabe under the preexisting lease agreement between Strickly and
McCabe and when it entered summary judgment in favor of CST based upon a
contractual obligation of Strickly to CST, without making any specific findings for the
basis of the contractual obligation or the terms of the contract and where other than
"implied consideration" no consideration between the parties was ever alleged by CST.
Response:

As has already been heavily discussed, McCabe validly assigned his

contractual right to payment from Strickly to CST. [Rec. Index pg. 206]. Once that
assignment had been made and Strickly had received notice and agreed to it, according to
U.C.A. § 70A-9a-406, the only way Strickly could discharge its debt to McCabe was to
pay CST. No consideration was necessary between CST and Strickly. See generally
U.C.A. § 70A-9a-406; Lone Mountain Production, 984 F.2d 1551; Clark, 584 P.2d 875.
The agreed upon performance had been executed by McCabe and McCabe assigned his
right to payment from Strickly to CST for consideration. [Rec. Index pg. 170]. Strickly
has failed to pay CST in accordance with its contractual obligations to both CST and
McCabe. [Rec. Index pg. 202]. Strickly failed to produce any evidence for the trial court
that controverted the amount CST conclusively proved it was owed in its Motion for
Summary Judgment, and thus Strickly was found liable for breach of contract and the
trial court properly entered summary judgment in favor of CST. [Rec. Index pg. 591].
This Court should affirm the ruling of the trial court.

CONCLUSION
Summary Judgment was properly granted by the trial court in favor of CST.
Based upon all the evidence the court had before it, construing the evidence in the light
most favorable to Strickly, and due to the fact that Strickly failed to Comply with URCP
Rule 7 and present any evidence to controvert the undisputed facts meticulously outlined
and compiled in CST's Motion for Summary Judgment other than by making bald
assertions without citation to any supporting evidence or documentation, CST was
entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter of law.
In its Appellate Brief, page 30, Strickly admitted that if this were an action for
failure or refusal to honor McCabe's assignment of right to payment from CST that the
trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of CST was proper:
"Had this truly been an action by CST against Strickly for its failure
or refusal to honor the assignment of the right to collect the accounts
receivable due to McCabe from Strickly to CST, then the Court would have
been spot on in its denial of Strickly's 12(b)(6) Motion and CST would
have been completely correct in its denials of the need for it to provide
additional consideration to Strickly before Strickly had any obligation to
CST."
CST's Motion for Summary Judgment dealt precisely with Strickly's failure to honor the
assignment of the right to collect the accounts receivable due to McCabe from Strickly to
CST. Whether or not there was any consideration between CST and Strickly regarding
McCabe's assignment of his right to payment from Strickly to CST is misplaced, and
irrelevant with regard to Strickly's obligation to pay CST in accordance with McCabe's
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invoices. Neither CST nor Strickly disputes the fact that there was consideration between
McCabe and Strickly. McCabe then validly assigned his right to payment from Strickly
to CST, and Strickly agreed to make payment directly to CST. CST has never disputed
that its right to receive payment from Strickly was conditioned by the Lease Agreement
between McCabe and Strickly, but Strickly presented no evidence to the trial court to
contradict CST's evidence that in accordance with McCabe's invoices, Strickly still owes
CST $5,695.30. Therefore CST respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial
court's entry of summary judgment in favor of CST.
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33, CST also respectfully requests
that this Court award CST its costs and attorney fees that were incurred as of necessity by
being forced to respond to Strickly's meritless and therefore frivolous appeal.

Submitted this , $ £ / day of October, 2009.

Dusten L. Heugly
Attorney for CST Financial ServicesTTXC
Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on fo&fjy day of October, 2009,1 served a copy of the
foregoing document, by U.S. Mail, to the following:

Gary Buhler
P.O. Box 229
Grantsville, Utah 84029-0229

Mike McCabe, pro-se
1392 Martha Dunyon Cir.
Draper, Utah 84020

Assistant to D
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
APPEALED: CASE #20090392
CST FINANCIAL SERVICES LLC vs. MIKE MCCABE
CASE NUMBER 050909240 Miscellaneous

CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
L A DEVER
PARTIES
Plaintiff - CST FINANCIAL SERVICES LLC
Represented by: DEE L HEUGLY
Plaintiff - CST FINANCIAL SERVICES LLC
Represented by: DUSTEN L HEUGLY
Defendant - MIKE MCCABE
Defendant -

MIKE MCCABE TRUCKING

Defendant - BILL STRICKLAND
Represented by: GARY A BUHLER
Defendant - STRICKLY TRUCKIN
Represented by: GARY A BUHLER
ACCOUNT SUMMARY
TOTAL REVENUE

Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Credit:
Balance:

BAIL/CASH BONDS

Posted:
Forfeited:
Refunded:
Balance:

646.75
646.75
0.00
0.00
300.00
0.00
0.00
300.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT 10K-MORE
Amount Due:
155.00
Amount Paid:
155.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COUNTER 10K-MORE
Amount Due:
105.00
Amount Paid:
105.00
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0.00
0.00

Amount Credit:
Balance:

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: CROSSCLAIM 10K-MORE
Amount Due:
105.00
Amount Paid:
105.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: JURY DEMAND - CIVIL
Amount Due:
7 5.00
Amount Paid:
75.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00

Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

1.75
1.75
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: APPEAL
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

205.00
205.00
0.00
0.00

BAIL/CASH BOND DETAIL - TYPE: CASH BOND: Appeals
Posted By: GARY A BUHLER
Posted:
300.00
Forfeited:
0.00
Refunded:
0.00
Balance:
300.00
CASE NOTE

PROCEEDINGS
05-20-05
05-20-05
05-20-05
05-20-05
05-20-05

Case filed
Judge L A DEVER assigned.
Filed: Complaint 10K-MORE
Fee Account created
Total Due:
155. 00
155.00
COMPLAINT 10K-MORE
Payment Received:
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT 10K-MORE, Mail Payment;
06-14-05 Filed: Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and
Request for Hearing
06-14-05 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Failure
to State a Claim or in the Alternative for Change of Venue
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06-17-05 Filed return: Summons on Return-Bill Strickland
Party Served: Tracy Strickland (Wife)
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: March 27, 2005
06-17-05 Filed return: Summons on Return-Miike McCabe
Party Served: Mike McCabe
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: June 08, 2005
06-24-05 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision Order to Dismiss for
Failure to State a Claim
06-27-05 Filed order: Order to Dismiss (Bill Strickland and Strickly
Trucking Inc. w/prejudice)
Judge L A DEVER
Signed June 26, 2005
06-30-05 Filed: Response to Defendant Bill Strickland and Strickly
Truckin's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
07-11-05 Filed: Clarification of Entry of Order
10-03-05 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside Default
Certificate
10-03-05 Filed: Affidavit of Plf's Atty Dusten L. Heugly
10-07-05 Filed: Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Set Aside Default
Certificate
10-17-05 Filed: Response to Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Set
Aside Default Certificate
10-25-05 Filed: Request for Hearing
10-27-05 Notice - NOTICE for Case 050909240 ID 6434140
ORAL ARGUMENTS/SET ASIDE is scheduled.
Date: 11/14/2005
Time: 03:00 p.m.
Location: Third Floor - S35
Third District Court
450 South State
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: L A DEVER
10-27-05 ORAL ARGUMENTS/SET ASIDE scheduled on November 14, 2005 at
03:00 PM in Third Floor - S35 with Judge DEVER.
11-14-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for ORAL ARGUMENTS/SET ASIDE
Judge:
L A DEVER
Clerk:
rhondam
PRESENT
Defendant(s): MIKE MCCABE
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): DUSTEN L HEUGLY
Defendant's Attorney(s): GARY A BUHLER
Audio
Tape Number:
Disk 056
Tape Count: 3:01-3:39

HEARING
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This case is before the Court for Oral Arguments re of Motion to
Set Aside. Counsel argues the case. After review of arguments in
this matter the Court grants plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside.
Court grants attorney's fees to the defendants.
Attorney's fees in the amount of $750.00 to be paid to defendant's
counsel within 30 days or Motion to Set Aside will not be granted.
03-08-06 Filed: Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Proposed
Findings of Fact and Order Setting Aside Dismissal
04-14-06 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision
04-14-06 Filed: Certificate of Service
04-24-06 Minute Entry - MINUTE ENTRY
Judge: L A DEVER
Clerk: debbiep
Based upon the review of the filing made since the Court's ruling
on November 14, 2005, it is obvious that the parties cannot agree
on the form of the Order. The court will, therefore, draft its own
Order.
04-24-06 Filed order: Order Setting Aside Dismissal
Judge L A DEVER
Signed April 24, 2006
07-11-06 Filed: Affidavit of Kara Harris
07-25-06 Filed: Request for Decision
07-31-06 Minute Entry - MINUTE ENTRY RULING-MOTION TO SET ASIDE
Judge: L A DEVER
Clerk: debbiep
On order of Judge Dever, Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Default
is granted.

Judge L A DEVER
10-13-06 Filed: Answer, Cross Claim Counterclaim and Demand for Jury
Trial
10-13-06 Filed: Counter 10K-MORE
10-13-06 Filed: Demand Civil Jury
10-13-06 Fee Account created
Total Due:
105.00
10-13-06 Fee Account created
Total Due:
105.00
10-13-06 Fee Account created
Total Due:
75.00
10-13-06 COUNTER 10K-MORE
Payment Received:
105.00
Note: Code Description: COUNTER 10K-MORE, CROSSCLAIM
10K-MORE, JURY DEMAND - CIVIL
10-13-06 CROSSCLAIM 10K-MORE
Payment Received:
105.00
10-13-06 JURY DEMAND - CIVIL
Payment Received:
75.00
10-30-06 Filed: Answer to Counterclaim-Bill Strickland and Strickly
Truckin's
BILL STRICKLAND
STRICKLY TRUCKIN
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12-06-06 Filed: Answer of Mike McCabe, Mike McCabeTrucking
MIKE MCCABE
MIKE MCCABE TRUCKING
12-06-06
03-15-07
03-26-07
04-24-07

Filed: Withdrawal of Counsel-Gregory B. Smith
Filed: Notice to Appoint Counsel or Appear in Person
Filed: Certificate of Service
Filed: Certificate of Delivery of Answers to the Petitioner's
Request for Admission
05-18-07 Filed: Certificate of Delivery of Answers to the Petitioner's
Interrogatories and Request for Production
11-19-08 Order to Show Cause scheduled on January 02, 2009 at 09:00 AM
in Third Floor - S35 with Judge DEVER.
11-19-08 Notice - NOTICE for Case 050909240 ID 11731500
Order to Show Cause.
Date: 1/2/2009
Time: 09:00 AM
Location: Third Floor - S35
L A DEVER
The parties and/or counsel in this case are to appear before this
Court and show cause why this case should not be dismissed.
If you do not appear, the Court will enter an Order of Dismissal
without further notice.
01-02-09 Minute Entry - Minutes for Order to Show Cause
Judge:
L A DEVER
Clerk:
darlac
PRESENT
Defendant's Attorney(s): GARY A BUHLER
Video
Tape Number:
211
Tape Count: 9:00

HEARING
TAPE: 211
COUNT: 9:00
This matter is before the Court of a Order to Show Cause Hearing.
Plaintiff given 30 Days to file necessary paper work.
01-09-09 Filed: Certificate of Service
01-09-09 Filed: Motion for Summary Judgment
Filed by: HEUGLY, DEE L
01-09-09 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
01-09-09 Filed: Affidavit of Kara Harris
01-09-09 Filed: Affidavit in Support of Attorney's Fees
01-20-09 Filed: Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment
01-20-09 Filed: Affidavit of Tracy Strickland
01-20-09 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision Defendant's Mottion to
Dismiss for Failure to State a claim or in the Alternative for

Printed: 10/29/09 15:21:26
CASE NUMBER 050909240 Miscellaneous

Page 5

Change of Venue.
01-21-09 Note: **Binder with Plf's Motion for Summary Judgment Pleadings
and Documents are in the top file cabinet**
02-17-09 Filed: Response to Defts1 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion
for Summary Judgment
02-17-09 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision
02-20-09 Filed: Second Notice to Submit for Decision Defendants Motion
to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim or in the Alternative
for Change of Venue
02-23-09 Filed: Memorandum of Points and Authorities Concerning Strickly
Truckinfs Motion to Dismiss or Alternative Change of Venue
03-31-09 Filed: Third Notice to Submit for Decision Deftfs Motion to
Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim or in the Alternative for
Change of Venue
04-15-09 Filed order: MINUTE ENTRY (See Written Decision)
Judge L A DEVER
Signed April 14, 2009
04-21-09 Fee Account created
Total Due:
1.75
04-21-09 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
1.75
05-05-09 Filed: Notice of Appeal
05-05-09 Filed: Notice of Appeal
05-05-09 Fee Account created
Total Due:
205.00
05-05-09 APPEAL
Payment Received:
205.00
Note: Code Description: APPEAL
05-05-09 Bond Account created
Total Due:
300.00
05-05-09 Bond Posted
Payment Received:
300.00
05-06-09 Note: Cert/copy of Notice of Appeal sent to Court of Appeals.
05-14-09 Filed: Supreme Court of Utah-Letter to Mr Buhler-Notice of
Appeal has been filed-Case # 20090392-SC should be reflected on
any future filings
05-14-09 Filed: Supreme Court of Utah-Order-Effective twenty days from
May 13, 2009 this matter will transfer to Utah Court of Appeals
05-14-09 Note: Appealed: Case #20090392
06-05-09 Filed: Letter from Court of Appeals to Mr. Buhler stating the
appeal has been filed. 20090392 CA
06-30-09 Filed: Transcript, original, of Oral Arguments on 11/14/05,
prepared by Beverly Lowe, CSR/CCT.
07-07-09 Note: Record Forwarded **AS IS** to Merilyn @ Utah Court of
Appeals -Files 2 Transcripts 1
07-10-09 Filed: Utah Court of Appeals
Letter to 3rd District Appellate
Clerk- Request for Pagination and Index-20090392-CA
07-29-09 Note: RECORD INDEXED
07-29-09 Note: CERT/COPY OF RECORD INDEX FORWARDED TO UTAH COURT OF
APPEALS
08-25-09 Filed: Ex Parte Motion for Hearing to Identify Judgment
Debtor's Property
08-26-09 Filed order: Order Scheduling Hearing to Identify Judgment
Debtor's Property
Judge L A DEVER
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Signed August 25, 2009
09-15-09 IDENTIFY JUDGMENT DEBTOR scheduled on October 23, 2009 at 09:15
AM in Third Floor - S35 with Judge DEVER.
10-21-09 Note: **Per phone call from Atty's Office, they werr not able
to serve the Deft, Hearing to be stricken from the calendar**
10-21-09 IDENTIFY JUDGMENT DEBTOR Cancelled.
Reason: Counsel's request.
10-28-09 Note: Record returned Files 2 transcripts 1
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